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In 1 normal 1 circumstances (though it is now difficult to remember 
when Scottish electoral politics were last 'normal') there would have 
been few doubts about the likely outcome of the Regional elections 
which took place on May 6th 1982. A Conservative government had been 
in office for three years. During this time unemployment had more than 
doubled to three million, and, as usual, the percentage unemployed in 
Scotland was above the British average, inflation was still higher than 
it had been when the Conservatives took over and there was little light 
on the economic horizon. For most of 1981 the Conservatives had Ian-
guished in public opinion polls especially in Scotland where their 
highest level of support reported by System Three was 18.0% compared 
with a maximum figure for Labour of 55.0% and a low of 40.0%. Labour 
should have been expected to reap rich electoral benefits, confirming 
and even extending its electoral dominance in Scotland. 
But in May 1982 things were far from normal. A number of factors 
complicated the political situation and made predictions of the outcome 
of these elections a chancy business.' Firstly, there was the state of 
the Labour party. Labour, nationally, had been in disarray for many 
months suffering a loss in morale and public support as a result of 
bruising internal constitutional and policy battles. Factional in-
fighting showed no signs of abating and the image of extremism and 
terminal decline was hard to avoid. Added to all this, the Labour 
leader, Michael Foot, was shown by opinion polls to be the least pop-
ular leader of the Opposition since the war. It is true that things 
were not as bleak-looking in Scotland, but the signs were ominous. In 
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January 1981, according to System Three, Labour had the support of 
55.0% of the Scottish Electorate; by March 1982, this had fallen to 
39.0% 
The second important factor making this an unusual election was 
the emergence of the SOP/Liberal Alliance as a potential electoral 
force. From the foundation of the SOP a year earlier, the Alliance had 
made a major impact, winning a string of local by-elections and having 
two stunning victories in parliamentary by-elections in England as well 
as running strongly in national opinion polls. Some commentators doubt-
ed whether the Alliance would fare as well in Scotland where commitment 
to Labour continued to be strong and there was already an 'anti-system' 
party in the form of the SNP. For the first three months of 1982 
Alliance support in System Three polls was slightly ahead of that for 
the Conservatives and it had overtaken the SNP, although, at 25.0% in 
January, it was well behind Labour. But only a month or so before the 
Regional elections, on March 25th, the Alliance in the person of Roy 
Jenkins won a parliamentary by-election in Glasgow Hillhead, taking 
the seat from the Conservatives, with Labour in third place. They 
therefore entered the Regional elections with high hopes. The question 
was whether they could successfully make inroads on a broad front in 
the first Scotland-wide challenge to the existing party system. 
The prospects for the Regional elections were also made more 
problematical by the potential electoral effect of the Falkland Islands 
crisis. The Conservative government had been doing badly in public 
opinion polls, but the Falklands dispute seemed to bring about an up-
surge in support. In Britain as a whole, Gallup gave the Conservatives 
31.0% of vote intentions in April, but this increased to 41.0% in May. 
The crisis had, of course, nothing to do with local government, but 
since local electoral behaviour is largely a response to national ev-
ents, issues and personalities, it was conceivable that the Falklands 
effect, coming quite out of the blue, could rescue the Conservatives 
from a rout such as they had never before experienced in Scotland. 
In at least one region, Lothian, it looked as if a real test of 
the effect of local issues on an election could at last be seen. 
Lothian Regional Council, controlled by a left-wing Labour group found 
itself in direct confrontation with the Conservative government. The 
Council refused to make expenditure cuts demanded by the Secretary of 
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State for Scotland and consequently had part of its central government 
grant withheld. Amid much publicity and acrimony Lothian Region seemed 
to verge on bankruptcy and during the election the Labour group explic-
itly appealed to the electorate to give them a mandate to continue their 
policy of defying the government. The situation seemed to have been 
tailor-made for the Alliance, and especially for the SOP. An 'extremist' 
Labour council and an interfering Conservative government, backed by 
the Lothian Region Conservative group, could be said to be playing 
politics at the expense of the interests of the people of the Region. 
A prominent member of the Labour group, an ex-convenor of the Region, 
despairing of the 'extremism' of his colleagues, had defected to the 
SOP and led what seemed to be a strong electoral challenge. Would there, 
then, be a 'Lothian effect' in the Regional elections? 
One thing was reasonably sure, the SNP was destined to do rela-
tively badly. Like the Labour Party, it suffered trauma from the set-
backs it received at the 1979 General Election. It too became involved 
in wrangles over leadership positions and policy and its best showing 
in the System Three Poll was 21.0% in October 1981 slightly below the 
SOP, this fell to 14.0% in January 1982. The SNP also came a rather 
poor fourth in the Hillhead by-election. 
Finally, and perhaps somewhat esoterically, these elections were 
complicated by the fact that they were fought on new electoral divi-
sion boundaries. This made predictions of the outcomes in individual 
divisions difficult (and it also inhibits analysis of the results). 
Of more general importance, however, the new electoral divisions were 
used by the Scottish Parliamentary Boundary Commission to construct 
revised parliamentary constituencies. The Regional elections there-
fore offered the parties and commentators an opportunity to assess the 
likely distribution of votes in the new constituencies. 
We shall return to these issues in due course. As in previous 
reports on Scottish local elections, however, we begin here by consid-
ering levels of participation by parties and electors. 
(1) Participation: Parties 
Table 1 shows the number of candidates from each party or group 











































In 1982 there was a record number of Regional Council candidates, 
an increase of 247 over the 1978 figure. The bulk of this increase was 
due to the Alliance which mushroomed from a pitiful 37 Liberal candi-
dates in 1978 to near parity with the three other major parties. The 
general increase in party activity was not confined to areas where 
elections were already dominated by parties. There is some evidence 
of a slow movement by parties into previously solidly Independent re-
gions. In Highland, Borders and Dumfries and Galloway the four major 
parties in 1974 accounted for 29% of all candidates. In 1978 this 
proportion inched upwards to 30% but in 1982 it was 45%. The day may 
not be far distant, then, when local elections throughout Scotland, 
at least at Regional level, will be party-dominated. 
One consequence of increased party activity in 1982 was a rise in 
the proportion of divisions that were actually contested. This rose to 
85.7% compared with 79.1% in 1978. No Region had fewer than 50% of 
seats contested (the lowest being Highland with 50%) and five had con-
tests in more than 90% of seats (Lothian 100%, Strathclyde 98.0%, 
Tayside 95.7%, Fife 95.6% and Central 91.2%). Only 63 seats in all 
(out of 441 at stake) were taken without a contest and as is usual at 
this level, Independents benefitted most in this way, taking 31 seats 
to 16 for the Conservatives, 14 for Labour and 1 each for the SNP and 
the Alliance. 
In the contested elections there were, of course, a variety of 
configurations of candidates. If, however, we consider only contests 
in which two or more of the major parties opposed one another then the 
developing pattern of party competition can be charted. This is done 
in Table 2. The first point of interest in this table is the steady 
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increase in the number of divisions in which two or more of the major 
parties faced one another. This reflects the increasing participation 
in the elections by the parties which we noted above. Even more strik-
ing, however, is the extent to which patterns of party competition 
have changed. Britain used to be thought the epitome of a two-party 
class-based system and indeed in 1974, Conservative v. Labour contests 
were the commonest form of party conflict, though even then accounting 
for only 40% of divisions in which party candidates opposed one another. 
But those days have long gone. In the 1978 elections over half of the 
TABLE 2 PARTY CONTESTS 
Con. v Lab. v Lib/SDP v SNP 
Con. v Lab. v Lib/SDP 
Con. v Lab. v SNP 
Con. v Lib/SDP v SNP 
Lab. v Lib/SDP v SNP 
Con. v Lab. 
Con. v Lib. 
Con. v SNP 
Lab. v Lib/SDP 
Lab. v SNP 
Lib/SOP v SNP 











































contests were three-way fights between the Conservatives, Labour and 
the SNP. By 1982 the commonest form of contest was a four-way battle, 
only 5% of contests were straight fights between the two former major 
parties. Electors, then, could have few complaints about the choice of 
candidates presented to them - their scope for choice has steadily in-
creased. If abstentions due to lack of choice were a significant fact-
or affecting turnout we might expect that the 1982 elections would re-
sult in an increased turnout of electors - a topic we now consider. 
(2) Participation: electors 
Table 3 shows the turnout in contested elections in each Region 
at each set of Regional elections. On the face of it the implicit 
hypotheses in the last sentence of the previous section is not support-
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ed by the data. Overall, turnout in the 1982 elections declined to 
42.9%. This decline was not uniform, however. Tayside and Lothian re-
corded significant increases in turnout. It would be premature to see 
this as necessarily part of a 'Lothian effect' since these two Regions 


























































also recorded the greatest proportionate increase in the number of 
candidates standing. In contrast,Central Region, which had the steep-
est turnout decline, was the only Region in which the number of candi-
dates decreased. 
If, however, we examine the data more closely it is clear that 
there is no systematic relationship between changes in the number of 
major party candidates and changes in turnout. The increased activity 
of the parties in the peripheral Regions did not lead to an increased 
turnout. And Lothian had only an average increase in major party candi-
datures. It could be, therefore, that the increased turnout in Tayside 
~ a consequence of increased major party candidatures (from 83 to 
145) while the increased turnout in Lothian (139 major party candidates 
in 1978, 185 in 1982) was due to the local political situation. 
Due to the changed boundaries of electoral divisions, which we 
noted above, we are unable to pursue the question of changes in turn-
out at the level of individual divisions. This would enable a more 
exact analysis of the effects of increased party competition upon turn-
out. It is clear, however, that turnout in Regional elections is now 
about the level of local election turnout in Scotland before local gov-
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ernment reorganisation, despite greatly increased commitment by the 
political parties. 
(3) Party Support: Votes 
Table 4 shows the distribution of votes over the whole country in 








































taking no account of variations in candidatures and unopposed returns. 
Nonetheless the general trend in votes in 1982 is clear enough. Labour 
maintained its hold on Scottish voters, its share of votes declining 
by only two percentage points despite its problems and the intervention 
of a large number of Alliance candidates. More significant losses of 
support were sustained by the Conservatives and the SNP. The latter 
dropped to fourth in popularity, being overtaken in one bound by the 
Alliance. The latter's showing in its first serious nationwide challenge 
was, of course, due in some part simply to the greatly increased number 
of candidates available to receive votes, but nonetheless 18% of the 
votes represents a substantial level of support. Changes in party supp-
ort between 1978 and 1982 within Regions are shown in Table 5. As can 
be seen there were considerable variations across Regions both in the 
strength and direction of change: thus, the Conservatives declined by 
13 points in Fife but increased by 17 in Borders. But these variations 
are due to a great extent to variations in candidature. 
TABLE 5 REGIONAL CHANGES IN PARTY SUPPORT 1978-1982 

























































To demonstrate this we calculated for each Region the change in each 
party's share of major party candidatures and its changed share of the 
vote. Correlating these 2 variables produces the following coefficients
-Conservatives .80, Labour .94, Alliance .95 and SNP .89. Although we 
have only 9 units of analysis these coefficients are large and show 
that much of the Regional variation in changes in party support is 
accounted for simply by variations in the number of candidates put 
forward. 
Taking account of changes in candidatures, however, it is clear 
that the Conservatives did relatively well and Labour badly in Lothian. 
By contrast Labour actually increased its share of the vote in Strath-
clyde, despite much keener competition, while the Conservatives slipped 
back. 
Most people are not tremendously interested in changing patterns 
of party support between one Regional election and the next. What con-
cerns them is change since the last General Election. The local elec-
tions are seen by many as a sort of super-opinion poll involving many 
thousands of electors and based on real votes rather than hypothetical 
vote intention. 
As before, however, variations in candidatures inhibit accurate 
measurement from General to Regional election figures. Nonetheless it 
is worth attempting some analysis of this. In order to control for 
candidate variations we have analysed separately those divisions and 
parliamentary constituencies in which voters were offered a choice be-
tween candidates of all four parties. Figures for Lothian, Strathclyde 
and the four other partisan regions are shown separately in Table 6. 
The numbers in brackets indicate the number of constituencies (1979) 
and divisions {1982) involved. In a sense what we have here are 3 
samples of constituencies and 3 of electoral divisions. Even if some 
inaccuracy arises from sampling, the trends in the different Regions 
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TABLE 6 







































are moderately clear. The Conservatives lost heavily in Strathclyde but 
more or less held their ground in other Regions. Labour lost heavily in 
Lothian and slightly in other Regions but increased their support in 
Strathclyde. The Alliance roughly doubled the Liberals' share of the 
vote everywhere and the SNP dropped slightly in Lothian and Strathclyde 
but rather more heavily elsewhere where their support was strongest. 
In terms of 1 swing 1 between the two leading parties, the figures 
show a 'swing' of 5.1% to Labour in Strathclyde, 3.7% to the Conserva-
tives in Lothian and 2% to the Conservatives in other Regions since 
the General Election. In a way this demonstrates the solidity of 
Labour support in Strathclyde. But we would suggest that the Strath-
clyde result is what might have been expected in normal circumstances, 
and that the other Regions' results are to be explained in terms of a 
combination of a 'Falklands' and a local effect. 
From Votes to Seats 
In Table 7 we show the number of seats gained by the various part-

































Due to boundary changes the overall number of seats to be filled in-
creased but even so the Conservatives lost seats compared with 1978. 
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Labour maintained its dominance while the Alliance received poor re-
ward for its reasonable showing in terms of votes. Somewhat surprising-
ly the SNP slightly increased the numbers of seats it won despite a 
smaller vote share. 
All of this demonstrates the effect of the electoral system. The 
'simple plurality' system in Britain has been much criticised of late 
for the disproportionate way in which it translates voting support into 
seats. Under this system the geographical distribution of support is 
almost as important as the amount of support gained. Thus, Independents 
gained only 5% of the Scottish vote but 14% of the contested seats be-
cause their support is concentrated in the peripheral Regions. In a 
similar way, though not to the same extent, the SNP benefitted from 
localised strength. 
The greatest sufferer from the operation of the electoral system 
was the Liberal/SOP Alliance, who are also its fiercest critics. The 
Alliance took 18% of the vote but only 6% of seats. The problems posed 
for the Alliance by the electoral system are perhaps most clearly ill-
ustrated in Lothian Region. In terms of votes they came only slightly 
behind the two main parties taking 26% compared to 31% for Labour and 
30% for the Conservatives. But the two latter parties each won 22 
seats while the Alliance won only 3. The problem, from the Alliance's 
point of view, was that they were quite popular throughout the Region 
but very popular in only a few seats. They achieved 25 second-places 
in three-way or four-way contests (10 to Labour and 15 to the Conserva-
tives) which certainly indicates wide support. But the electoral system 
does not reward wide support; concentrations of support are needed to 
win seats. 
The various losses and gains of seats had effects on the political 
control of Regional authorities in only one case. Labour lost control 
of the Lothian Region and subsequently the Conservatives were able to 
form an administration with the support of the Alliance. In other Re-
gions it was 'as you were' with Labour controlling Fife, Central and 
Strathclyde, the Conservatives holding on to Grampian and Tayside and 
Independents dominating Border, Highland and Dumfries and Galloway. 
Conclusion 
At the outset we suggested that there were four features of part-
icular interest in the 1982 Regional elections - the Alliance, the 
78 
•Falklands effect', the 'Lothian effect' and the implications for re-
vised parliamentary constituencies. 
After the election much comment concerned the lack of success of 
the Alliance certainly compared with its aspirations. In some ways 
this could be said to be a bit overdrawn. The Alliance, as we have 
seen, gained 18% of the total vote in Scotland, relegating the SNP to 
fourth place. Alliance candidates got more votes than the SNP in 84% 
of the divisions in which they were in direct competition. In some 
areas too the Alliance outpolled the major parties - beating Labour in 
Edinburgh, for instance, and the Conservatives in Fife. 
Where the Alliance failed was in not being able to translate this 
electoral support into seats. More than a hundred second places were 
obtained, but second places count for nothing given the electoral sys-
tem. This highlights the problems the Alliance will face in the next 
general election and there is not very much they can do about it. They 
can hardly make electoral pacts with Labour in some seats and the Con-
servatives in others, nor can they expect their supporters to move 
into a number of selected constituencies. All they can do is wait and 
hope that their support in Scotland increases to the point where they 
benefit from the quirks of the electoral system, leaving their oppon-
ents to complain about its unfairness. 
Boundary changes prevent any extended analysis of the effects of 
Alliance intervention. It does seem, however, that the Alliance tended 
to take votes from the challenging party, i.e. from Labour in Conser-
vative seats and vice versa. This interpretation is suggested by the 
data in Table 8 which shows the division of the vote among the four 
main parties in constituencies which they all contested in 197Q and 
divisions in which there were four-way contests in 1982, considering 
separately those won by Labour and those won by the Conservatives. 































In Labour-held areas the Alliance's advance seems to have been almost 
wholly at the expense of the Conservatives who dropped to third place 
while the Labour vote was steady. In Conservative-held areas, on the 
other hand, the Conservative vote share increased while Labour lost 
significantly and dropped to third place. The SNP also dropped signi-
ficantly here perhaps indicating that tactical voting for the SNP 
against the Conservatives was replaced in the Regional elections by 
tactical voting for the Alliance. 
We noted in the introduction that the Conservatives might have 
been expected, if electoral politics had been 'normal' to have been 
routed in these elections. Their support in Scottish opinion polls was 
very low in the months preceding the elections (although it had risen 
quite dramatically from 17% in February to 25% in May) and they lost 
the once impregnable Hillhead seat in a parliamentary by-election. In 
the event, though the Conservative vote declined and they lost some 
seats, the results were by no means a rout. They remained the second 
party in Scotland in terms of votes and seats and, in addition to dis-
lodging Labour in Lothian through an arrangement with the Alliance, 
they retained control of those regions they already held. It is, of 
course, impossible to know what precisely explains the general Conser-
vative performance. It may be that they are now down to hard rock supp-
ort that cannot decline much further. It would be surprising, however, 
if there were no 'Falklands effect'. This seems the most likely reason 
for the increase in support for them during the month of April. But 
clearly this 'effect' was far less important in Scotland than in 
England as is evidenced by opinion polls and the contrasting results 
in parliamentary by-elections in Beaconsfield and Coatbridge and Airdrie 
which followed the Regional elections. 
There is rather firmer evidence of a 'Lothian effect•. As we have 
seen, Lothian was one of only 3 regions in which turnout increased. 
This region also produced one of the smallest declines in the Conser-
vative's share of the vote and the largest decline in Labour's share 
so that there was a crude net 'saving' from Labour to the Conservatives 
of 3.4% between 1978 and 1982. It was in Lothian too, that the Alliance 
recorded its highest share of the vote apparently disproportionately 
at Labour's expense. A comparison of the general election figures with 
the regional elections in Lothian showed a similar pattern with Labour 
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doing worse and the Conservatives better than elsewhere. It would 
appear, then, that all the publicity surrounding the Labour adminis-
tration in Lothian did have an electoral effect and that, unusually, 
local issues affected the result to Labour's disadvantage. 
Labour's internal problems seem not to have had a very serious 
effect on their support in these elections, and certainly not as much 
as it had in England. If the Conservatives have now declined to a bed-
rock of support it also seems likely that Labour has, on any conven-
tional calculation, almost reached a maximum level, at least in the 
short-term. Any further increase is likely to be marginal. The degree 
of Labour strength in Scotland, and its solidity asserted at the last 
general election and more or less confirmed at the Regional elections, 
in contrast to that in England, has important implications for the fu-
ture of British politics. 
Finally, what about the parties' prospects in the proposed new 
parliamentary constituencies? The Parliamentary Boundary Commission 
has produced revised recommendations for 4 of the partisan Regions 
(Strathclyde, Lothian, Central and Tayside). If the Regional election 
results in these Regions are aggregated to the new constituencies the 
effect would be that Labour would win 39 seats and the Conservatives 
13. In the same area in the 1979 General Election the result was 
Labour 39, Conservatives 12, SNP 1. Given that the Conservatives did 
not do particularly well in these elections it would seem that bound-
ary revisions will operate slightly in their favour. 
On these results the SNP would lose Dundee East, their only seat 
on mainland Scotland, to Labour and would gain none. The Alliance also 
would win no seats, though they would gain 8 second places. Best bet 
for the Alliance look to be Hillhead (Lab.31%, Con. 30%, Alliance 30%), 
Renfrew West and Inverclyde (Lab. 35%, Alliance 34%) and Edinburgh 
South (Con. 38%, Alliance 31%). 
Some of the other seats we have assigned to the Conservatives or 
Labour also look decidely marginal. On the Labour side these are 
Cunninghame North (Lab. 38% Con. 36%) and Linlithgow (Lab. 38% SNP 
36%) while the Conservatives would only just win Cathcart (Con. 38% 
Lab. 37%), Edinburgh East (Con. 36% Lab 35%) and Stirling (where it is 
impossible to give figures due to variations in candidancies). 
Though the Regional elections will be the last set of local elec-
tions in Scotland before the next general election it would be fool-
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ish to make predictions based on them. The regional results themselves 
indicate the continuing changes in electoral behaviour in Scotland. 
Much depends on whether the Government's popularity over the Falklands 
issue proves to be temporary and whether the SOP/Liberal Alliance can 
recover the momentum that it had throughout 1981 in England and Wales 
and transfers this to Scotland. If it does, Scotland, which already has 
an established three-party system, will continue to be idiosyncratic by 
having a four-party system. 
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